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Intensity valence

Author

Listed:
  • Fabian Gouret
  • Stéphane Rossignol

    (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA)

Abstract

This paper studies a continuous one-dimensional spatial model of electoral competition with two office-motivated candidates differentiated by their “intensity” valence. All voters agree that one candidate will implement more intensively his announced policy than his opponent. However, and contrary to existing models, the intensity valence has a different impact on the utility of voters according to their position in the policy space. The assumption that voters have utility functions with intensity valence, an assumption which has been found to be grounded empirically, generates very different results than those obtained with traditional utility functions with additive valence. First, the candidate with low intensity valence is supported by voters whose ideal points are on both extremes of the policy space. Second, there exist pure strategy Nash equilibria in which the winner is the candidate with high intensity if the distribution of voters in the policy space is sufficiently homogeneous. On the contrary, if the distribution of voters in the policy space is very heterogeneous, there are pure strategy Nash equilibria in which the candidate with low intensity wins. For moderate heterogeneity of the distribution of voters, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabian Gouret & Stéphane Rossignol, 2016. "Intensity valence," Thema Working Papers 2016-07, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
    • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2016-07
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    Cited by:

    1. Denter, Philipp, 2021. "Valence, complementarities, and political polarization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 39-57.
    2. Mathieu Martin & Zéphirin Nganmeni & Ashley Piggins & Élise F. Tchouante, 2022. "Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence: existence and characterization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 301-316, March.
    3. Fabian Gouret, 2021. "Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich–McKelvey scaling," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(3), pages 177-226, September.
    4. Mamadou Boukari & Etienne Farvaque & Daniel Cakpo-Tozo, 2019. "“Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!†Popularity Gains as an Incentive to Legislate Frantically?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(2), pages 1488-1507.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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