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“Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!†Popularity Gains as an Incentive to Legislate Frantically?

Author

Listed:
  • Mamadou Boukari

    () (LEM (UMR 9221, Université de Lille et CNRS))

  • Etienne Farvaque

    () (LEM (UMR 9221, Université de Lille et CNRS) et Cirano (Québec, Canada))

  • Daniel Cakpo-Tozo

    () (KPMG)

Abstract

The paper analyzes the relations between the legal and regulatory production and the gains of popularity for the President and the Prime Minister in France. Using the GMM system estimation, we show that the Executive's popularity depends on legisla- tive activism, creating reasons to legislate frantically, but also that the Executive has strong incentives to strategically set the legislative agenda, possibly timing landmark laws during honeymoon periods. Moreover, if Prime Ministers can benefit actions taken in the last months of their term, this is not true for Presidents. Our results also confirm the traditional view, according to which incumbents are always bestowed with favorable ratings when the economic situation improves.

Suggested Citation

  • Mamadou Boukari & Etienne Farvaque & Daniel Cakpo-Tozo, 2019. "“Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!†Popularity Gains as an Incentive to Legislate Frantically?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(2), pages 1488-1507.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00767
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Antoine Auberger, 2011. "Popularity Functions for the French President and Prime Minister (1995-2007)," Working Papers halshs-00872313, HAL.
    5. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1994. "The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 213-245, June.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legal production; Regulation; Semi-presidential government system; Popularity; France;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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