Last minute policies and the incumbency advantage
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- Elena Manzoni & Stefan P. Penczynski, 2012. "Last Minute Policies and the Incumbency Advantage," CESifo Working Paper Series 3773, CESifo Group Munich.
- Manzoni, Elena & Penczynski, Stefan P., 2014. "Last minute policies and the incumbency advantage," Working Papers 14-24, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:01:p:177-181_25 is not listed on IDEAS
- Toke Aidt & Francisco Veiga & Linda Veiga, 2011.
"Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model,"
Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 21-44, July.
- Linda Gonçalves Veiga & Francisco José Veiga & Toke S. Aidt, 2009. "Election Results and Opportunistic Policies: A New Test of the Rational Political Business Cycle Model," NIPE Working Papers 24/2009, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
- Aidt, T.S. & Veiga, F.J. & Veiga, L.G., 2009. "Election Results and Opportunistic Policies: A New Test of the Rational Political Business Cycle Model," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0934, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Hodler, Roland & Loertscher, Simon & Rohner, Dominic, 2010.
"Inefficient policies and incumbency advantage,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 761-767, October.
- Hodler, R. & Loertscher , S. & Rohner, D., 2007. "Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0738, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2007. "Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 996, The University of Melbourne.
- Arnaud Dellis, 2009. "The Salient Issue of Issue Salience," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(2), pages 203-231, April.
More about this item
KeywordsIncumbency advantage; electoral competition; information revelation; agenda;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-03-02 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-POL-2013-03-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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