Last minute policies and the incumbency advantage
This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency advantage. In a two-period electoral campaign with two policy issues, a specialized incumbent and an unspecialized, but possibly more competent challenger compete for election by voters who are heterogeneously informed about the state of the world. Due to the asymmetries in government responsibility between candidates, the incumbent's statement may convey information on the relevance of the issues to voters. In equilibrium, the incumbent sometimes strategically releases his statement early and thus signals the importance of his signature issue to the voters. We find that, since the incumbent's positioning on the issue reveals private information which the challenger can use in later statements, the incumbent's incentives to distort the campaign are decreasing in the quality of the incumbent, as previously documented by the empirical literature. However, we show that this implies a non-monotonicity in the distortions that arise in equilibrium.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2013|
|Date of revision:||Jan 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Piazza Ateneo Nuovo, 1 Milano 20126|
Phone: +39 02 6448 3089
Fax: +39 02 6448 3085
Web page: http://dems.unimib.it
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Arnaud Dellis, 2009. "The Salient Issue of Issue Salience," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(2), pages 203-231, 04.
- Linda Gonçalves Veiga & Francisco José Veiga & Toke S. Aidt, 2009.
"Election Results and Opportunistic Policies: A New Test of the Rational Political Business Cycle Model,"
NIPE Working Papers
24/2009, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
- Toke Aidt & Francisco Veiga & Linda Veiga, 2011. "Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 21-44, July.
- Aidt, T.S. & Veiga, F.J. & Veiga, L.G., 2009. "Election Results and Opportunistic Policies: A New Test of the Rational Political Business Cycle Model," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0934, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2007.
"Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
996, The University of Melbourne.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:229. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Matteo Pelagatti)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.