Electoral Competition through Issue Selection
Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the votersâ€™ true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with â€œbetterâ€ policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their â€œhistorical issuesâ€ or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less.
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- Aragonès, Enriqueta & Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago, 2010.
"The disadvantage of winning an election,"
SIRE Discussion Papers
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- Josep M. Colomer & Humberto Llavador, 2008. "An Agenda-Setting Model of Electoral Competition," Working Papers 331, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- AMOROS, Pablo & PUY, M. Socorro, 2007. "Dialogue or issue divergence in the political campaign?," CORE Discussion Papers 2007084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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