The Disadvantage of Winning an Election
This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from diﬀerent sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition.
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- Carmen Bevi? & Humberto Llavador, 2006. "The Informational Value of Incumbency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 662.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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- Helios Herrera & Andrea Mattozzi, 2010.
"Quorum and Turnout in Referenda,"
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- Hanna Ågren & Matz Dahlberg & Eva Mörk, 2007.
"Do politicians’ preferences correspond to those of the voters? An investigation of political representation,"
Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 137-162, January.
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- Gautam Gowrisankaran & Matthew F. Mitchell & Andrea Moro, 2004. "Why Do Incumbent Senators Win? Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model," NBER Working Papers 10748, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2008.
"Referenda as a Catch-22,"
17084, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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