The disadvantage of winning an election
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- AragonÃ¨s, Enriqueta & SÃ¡nchez-PagÃ©s, Santiago, 2010. "The disadvantage of winning an election," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-21, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Santiago Sánchez-Páges, 2010. "The Disadvantage of Winning an Election," Working Papers 439, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, 2010. "The disadvantage of winning an election," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 811.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
References listed on IDEAS
- Hanna Ågren & Matz Dahlberg & Eva Mörk, 2007.
"Do politicians’ preferences correspond to those of the voters? An investigation of political representation,"
Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 137-162, January.
- Dahlberg, Matz & Mörk, Eva & Ågren, Hanna, 2004. "Do Politicians’ Preferences Correspond to those of the Voters? An Investigation of Political Representation," Working Paper Series 2004:2, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Frey, Bruno S & Stutzer, Alois, 2000.
"Happiness, Economy and Institutions,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 918-938, October.
- Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Happiness, Economy and Institutions," IEW - Working Papers 015, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2000. "Happiness, Economy and Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 246, CESifo Group Munich.
- Dimitrios Xefteris, 2011. "Referenda as a Catch-22," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(1), pages 121-138, June.
- Helios Herrera & Andrea Mattozzi, 2010. "Quorum and Turnout in Referenda," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(4), pages 838-871, June.
- Gautam Gowrisankaran & Matthew F. Mitchell & Andrea Moro, 2004. "Why Do Incumbent Senators Win? Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model," NBER Working Papers 10748, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Carmen Beviá & Humberto Llavador, 2009.
"The Informational Value of Incumbency,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(5), pages 773-796, October.
- Carmen Bevi? & Humberto Llavador, 2006. "The Informational Value of Incumbency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 662.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Carmen Bevia & Humberto Llavador, 2006. "The Informational Value of Incumbency," Working Papers 276, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Humberto Llavador & Carmen Beviá, 2006. "The informational value of incumbency," Economics Working Papers 962, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct Democracy: Politico-economic Lessons from Swiss Experience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 338-342, May.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:86:y:1992:i:04:p:951-965_09 is not listed on IDEAS
- Richard D. Mckelvey & Raymond Riezman, 2013.
"Seniority in Legislature,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 12, pages 185-199
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Lee, David S., 2008. "Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House elections," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 675-697, February.
- Aragonès, Enriqueta & Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago, 2009. "A theory of participatory democracy based on the real case of Porto Alegre," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 56-72, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Aragonés, Enriqueta & Castanheira, Micael & Giani, Marco, 2012.
"Electoral Competition through Issue Selection,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
9012, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Micael Castanheira & Marco Giani, 2012. "Electoral Competition through Issue Selection," Working Papers 641, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Micael Castanheira & Marco Giani, 2012. "Electoral Competition through Issue Selection," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 903.12, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Micael Castanheira De Moura & Marco Giani & Enriqueta Aragonès, 2015. "Electoral Competition through Issue Selection," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/159851, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
More about this item
Keywordsincumbency advantage; referenda; popular initiatives; elections;
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-06-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2010-06-04 (Positive Political Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:194. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Research Office). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deediuk.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.