IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvco/2007084.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Dialogue or issue divergence in the political campaign?

Author

Listed:
  • AMOROS, Pablo
  • PUY, M. Socorro

Abstract

We incorporate the media priming effects to explain how politicians can affect voters preferences on issues during the political campaign. We adapt well-known terms of international trade, such as absolute advantage and comparative advantage, to the context of parties' competition in political issues. We show that when either each party has an absolute advantage on a different issue or when parties have high comparative advantage on a different issue, the political campaign will consist of issue-emphasis divergence. However, when a party has an absolute advantage on both issues but the parties' comparative advantage is not high enough, the political campaign will consist of issue engagement or dialogue. Our results conciliate two separated theories concerning whether there must be dialogue or issue-emphasis divergence in the political campaign.

Suggested Citation

  • AMOROS, Pablo & PUY, M. Socorro, 2007. "Dialogue or issue divergence in the political campaign?," CORE Discussion Papers 2007084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2007084
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2007_84.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Josep Colomer & Humberto Llavador, 2012. "An agenda-setting model of electoral competition," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 73-93, March.
    2. Enriqueta Aragonès & Micael Castanheira & Marco Giani, 2012. "Electoral Competition through Issue Selection," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 903.12, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    3. Demange, Gabrielle & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "A communication game on electoral platforms," IDEI Working Papers 589, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    4. Pablo Amorós & M. Puy, 2010. "Indicators of electoral victory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 239-251, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    political campaign; media priming; political issues; spatial model;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2007084. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.