An agenda-setting model of electoral competition
This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of the public agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition compete in elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience to an issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal alternative to the status-quo. Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters concerns and those with broad consensus on some policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probability of victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters decision. Remarkably, the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may not be given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survive in spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad consensus on a policy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of the United States presidential election in 2004.
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Volume (Year): 3 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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- AMOROS, Pablo & PUY, M. Socorro, 2007. "Dialogue or issue divergence in the political campaign?," CORE Discussion Papers 2007084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Riccardo Puglisi & Josep Colomer, 2005. "Issues, cleavages and parties: a critical review of the literature," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/10383, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Pablo Amorós & M. Puy, 2010.
"Indicators of electoral victory,"
Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 239-251, July.
- Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias, 2010. "The binary policy model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 661-688, March.
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