Institutional Bias Towards The Status Quo
Some societies appear to be better equipped than others to implement efficiency enhancing policy reforms and to deliver positive results out of their implementation. Our model presents an under-examined element of policy reform and institutional quality, showing how the characteristics of the political system may render citizens unable to properly reward politicians who implement new projects, thus favoring politicians who secure the status quo, albeit mediocre, of the economy. In such an environment, new policy projects are sidelined and political institutional quality remains inert. Political institutions matter because they affect the value for the politicians of staying in office. We show that societies with a suboptimal political system may present institutional bias towards the status quo. This bias arises due to the inability of the citizens to design an effective voting rule that induces politicians to implement new projects successfully.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Casilla No967, Santiago|
Phone: (562) 670 2000
Fax: (562) 698 4847
Web page: http://www.bcentral.cl/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sanjay Jain & Sharun W. Mukand, 2003. "Redistributive Promises and the Adoption of Economic Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 256-264, March.
- Aidt, T.S. & Eterovic, D.S., 2007. "Give and Take: Political Competition, Participation and Public Finance in 20th Century Latin America," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0714, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991.
"Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?,"
6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Romain Wacziarg & Karen Horn Welch, 2003.
"Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence,"
NBER Working Papers
10152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dani Rodrik, 1988.
"Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signaling,"
NBER Working Papers
2600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rodrik, Dani, 1989. "Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signalling," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(397), pages 756-72, September.
- Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
- Torsten Persson, 2005.
"Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development,"
NBER Working Papers
11171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Torsten, 2005. "Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 4938, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Francesco Giavazzi & Guido Tabellini, 2004.
"Economic and Political Liberalizations,"
264, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Francesco Giavazzi & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Economic and Political Liberalizations," NBER Working Papers 10657, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Francesco Giavazzi & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Economic and Political Liberalizations," CESifo Working Paper Series 1249, CESifo Group Munich.
- Giavazzi, Francesco & Tabellini, Guido, 2004. "Economic and Political Liberalizations," CEPR Discussion Papers 4579, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Francesco Giavazzi & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Economic and Political Liberalizations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000724, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, .
CARESS Working Papres
97-2, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, . "Policy Persistence," Penn CARESS Working Papers 8a66677895e9fcb3f6d813c0c, Penn Economics Department.
- Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, . ""Policy Persistence ''," CARESS Working Papres 95-19, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Aidt, Toke & Dutta, Jayasri & Sena, Vania, 2008.
"Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence,"
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-220, June.
- Toke Aidt & Jayasri Dutta & Vania Sena, 2006. "Governance Regimes, Corruption and Growth: Theory and Evidence," Discussion Papers 15_2006, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
- Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995.
"Economic Reform and the Progress of Global Integration,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1733, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995. "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(1, 25th A), pages 1-118.
- Dani Rodrik, 1989.
"Policy Uncertainty and Private Investment in Developing Countries,"
NBER Working Papers
2999, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Policy uncertainty and private investment in developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 229-242, October.
- Toke Aidt & Francesco Magris, 2004.
"Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability,"
Documents de recherche
04-18, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
- Aidt, Toke S. & Dutta, Jayasri, 2007. "Policy myopia and economic growth," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 734-753, September.
- Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1994. " The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 213-45, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chb:bcchwp:543. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Claudio Sepulveda)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.