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Political Competition and Policy Choices: The Evidence From Agricultural Protection

  • Jan Fałkowski


    (Faculty of Economic Sciences and Centre for Economic Analyses of Public Sector (CEAPS), University of Warsaw)

  • Alessandro Olper


    (Università degli Studi di Milano and LICOS)

This paper investigates whether political competition plays an important role in determining the level of agricultural protection. In order to do so, we exploit variation in political and economic data from 74 developing and developed countries for the post-war period. We use two measures of political competition: one that captures the extent to which political power can be freely contested regardless of election results and one based on vote share at last parliamentary elections. Our results, based on static and dynamic panel estimators, show unambiguously that the level of support for agriculture is the higher, the higher is the level of political competition.

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Paper provided by Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw in its series Working Papers with number 2012-18.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:war:wpaper:2012-18
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