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Land inequality, government ideology and agricultural protection

  • Olper, Alessandro

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VCB-4JXRXB9-2/2/ce0693a79abdb9b326664f8699466a5c
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Food Policy.

Volume (Year): 32 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 67-83

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfpoli:v:32:y:2007:i:1:p:67-83
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/foodpol

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  1. Swinnen, Johan F. M. & Gorter, Harry de & Rausser, Gordon C. & Banerjee, Anurag N., 2000. "The political economy of public research investment and commodity policies in agriculture: an empirical study," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 111-122, March.
  2. Pushan Dutt & Devashish Mitra, 2005. "Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(1), pages 59-72, February.
  3. Hans P. Binswanger & Klaus Deininger, 1997. "Explaining Agricultural and Agrarian Policies in Developing Countries," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(4), pages 1958-2005, December.
  4. Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1997. "Wealth Inequality and Efficiency in the Commons: Part I: The Unregulated Case," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 451-82, October.
  5. Easter, K. William & Palanisami, Kuppannan, 1986. "Tank Irrigation In India And Thailand: An Example Of Common Property Resource Management," Staff Papers 13888, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
  6. Alesina, Alberto & Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 465-90, May.
  7. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, June.
  8. Deininger, Klaus & Squire, Lyn, 1998. "New ways of looking at old issues: inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 259-287.
  9. Barrett, Christopher B., 1999. "The microeconomics of the developmental paradox: on the political economy of food price policy," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 159-172, March.
  10. Alessandro Olper, 2001. "Determinants of Agricultural Protection: The Role of Democracy and Institutional Setting Alessandro Olper," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 75-92.
  11. Bates, Robert H., 1983. "Patterns of market intervention in agrarian Africa," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 297-304, November.
  12. Timmer, C. Peter, 2002. "Agriculture and economic development," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 29, pages 1487-1546 Elsevier.
  13. Deininger, Klaus & Olinto, Pedro, 2000. "Asset distribution, inequality, and growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2375, The World Bank.
  14. Beghin, John C & Kherallah, Mylene, 1994. "Political Institutions and International Patterns of Agricultural Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(3), pages 482-89, August.
  15. Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
  16. Swinnen, Johan F. M. & Banerjee, Anurag N. & Gorter, Harry de, 2001. "Economic development, institutional change, and the political economy of agricultural protection: An econometric study of Belgium since the 19th century," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 25-43, October.
  17. La Ferrara, Eliana, 2000. "Inequality And Group Participation: Theory And Evidence From Rural Tanzania," CEPR Discussion Papers 2433, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Magee, Christopher, 2002. "Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: an application to the free-rider problem," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 449-471, August.
  19. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
  20. Swinnen, Johan F. M., 2002. "Political reforms, rural crises, and land tenure in western Europe," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 371-394, August.
  21. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
  22. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
  23. van Bastelaer, Thierry, 1998. " The Political Economy of Food Pricing: An Extended Empirical Test of the Interest Group Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 43-60, July.
  24. Pushan Dutt & Devashish Mitra, 2003. "Labor Versus Capital in Trade-Policy Determination: The Role of General-Interest and Special-Interest Politics," NBER Working Papers 10084, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Dutt, Pushan & Mitra, Devashish, 2002. "Endogenous trade policy through majority voting: an empirical investigation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 107-133, October.
  26. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 652-60, June.
  27. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
  28. Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-84, October.
  29. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December.
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