Wealth Inequality and Efficiency in the Commons: Part I: The Unregulated Case
Does more inequality lead to more efficiency in the management of common property resources? To answer this question, an attempt is made to develop relevant theoretical models and to articulate them with empirical evidence drawn mainly from social science studies. The paper is divided into two parts. In this, the first part, assuming away the possibility of regulatory instruments, the authors construct a series of arguments pointing to the ambiguous impact of wealth inequality on the efficiency of the equilibrium outcomes. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.
Volume (Year): 49 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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