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Democracy, education and the quality of government

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  • Piergiuseppe Fortunato

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  • Ugo Panizza

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Abstract

This paper looks at how the interaction between democracy and education affects the quality of government. Using various cross-sectional and dynamic panel data specifications, we show that the success of democratic institutions is closely related to the educational attainment of the population. Democratic elections do not foster the quality of government in countries with low average levels of education. Education, in turn, has a positive effect on the quality of government only in consolidated democracies. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

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  • Piergiuseppe Fortunato & Ugo Panizza, 2015. "Democracy, education and the quality of government," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 333-363, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jecgro:v:20:y:2015:i:4:p:333-363
    DOI: 10.1007/s10887-015-9120-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Piergiuseppe Fortunato & Ugo Panizza, 2015. "Democracy, education and the quality of government," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 333-363, December.
    2. M. Rodwan Abouharb & David Cingranelli & Mikhail Filippov, 2019. "Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance," Social Sciences, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(5), pages 1-22, May.
    3. Baltrunaite, Audinga & Bello, Piera & Casarico, Alessandra & Profeta, Paola, 2014. "Gender quotas and the quality of politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 62-74.
    4. Daniel Albalate & Germà Bel, 2018. "“Do government formation deadlocks damage economic growth? Evidence from history’s longest period of political deadlock”," IREA Working Papers 201817, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jul 2018.
    5. Pierre André & Paul Maarek, 2017. "Education, social capital and political participation Evidence from school construction in Malian villages," THEMA Working Papers 2017-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    6. Ezcurra, Roberto & Zuazu, Izaskun, 2019. "Political equality and quality of government," MPRA Paper 96476, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Kotschy, Rainer & Sunde, Uwe, 2017. "Democracy, inequality, and institutional quality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 209-228.
    8. Ozana Nadoveza Jelic & Margareta Gardijan Kedzo, 2018. "Efficiency vs effectiveness: an analysis of tertiary education across Europe," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 42(4), pages 381-414.
    9. Krieger, Tommy, 2019. "Democracy and institutional quality: Theory and Evidence," Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203507, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Elena Sochirca & Francisco José Veiga, 2018. "Key determinants of elite rivalry: theoretical insights and empirical evidence," NIPE Working Papers 02/2018, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    11. Piergiuseppe Fortunato & Marco Pecoraro, 2020. "Yes, The Medium Matters: How Facebook and Twitter boost Populism in Europe," IRENE Working Papers 20-01, IRENE Institute of Economic Research.
    12. Mitu Gulati & Ugo Panizza, 2018. "Maduro Bonds," IHEID Working Papers 12-2018, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    13. Williams, Kevin, 2017. "Do remittances improve political institutions? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 65-75.
    14. Piergiuseppe Fortunato, 2015. "Democratic Government and Development: A Survey," Asian Development Review, MIT Press, vol. 32(2), pages 153-177, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Education; Democracy; Quality of government; Corruption; Elections; Institutions; D72; D73; H11; O43;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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