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Vote‐Buying and Reciprocity

  • Frederico Finan
  • Laura Schechter

While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.3982/ECTA9035
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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 80 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
Pages: 863-881

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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:80:y:2012:i:2:p:863-881
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  7. Dean S. Karlan, 2005. "Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital And Predict Financial Decisions," Working Papers 909, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
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