Are all democracies equally good? The role of interactions between political environment and inequality for rule of law
Using cross-country data, we find evidence for a significant interaction effect between democracy and equality in determining the quality of growth-promoting institutions like rule of law. Democracy is associated with better rule of law when inequality is lower.
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