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The People Want the Fall of the Regime": Schooling, Political Protest, and the Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Filipe R. Campante

    () (Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University)

  • Davin Chor

    () (School of Economics, Singapore Management University)

Abstract

We examine several hypotheses regarding the determinants and implications of political protest, motivated by the wave of popular uprisings in Arab countries starting in late 2010. We draw attention to one of the most fundamental correlates of political activity identi ed in the literature, namely education, and its interaction with economic circumstances. Using a combination of individual-level micro data and cross-country macro data, we highlight how rising levels of education coupled with economic under-performance display a strong link with participation in protest modes of political activity as well as incumbent turnover. Political protests are thus more likely when an increasingly educated populace does not have commensurate economic gains. We also nd that the implied political instability is associated with heightened pressures towards democratization.

Suggested Citation

  • Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor, 2012. "The People Want the Fall of the Regime": Schooling, Political Protest, and the Economy," Working Papers 08-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:siu:wpaper:08-2012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sarah Brockhoff & Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2012. "Great Expectations and Hard Times — The (Nontrivial) Impact of Education on Domestic Terrorism," Working Papers CIE 47, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    2. Rougier, Eric, 2016. "“Fire in Cairo”: Authoritarian–Redistributive Social Contracts, Structural Change, and the Arab Spring," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 148-171.
    3. repec:eee:jcecon:v:46:y:2018:i:2:p:656-682 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor, 2012. "Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 167-188, Spring.
    5. El-Mallakh, Nelly & Maurel, Mathilde & Speciale, Biagio, 2018. "Arab spring protests and women's labor market outcomes: Evidence from the Egyptian revolution," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 656-682.
    6. repec:spr:empeco:v:54:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s00181-016-1214-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Nelly El-Mallakh & Mathilde Maurel & Biagio Speciale, 2016. "Arab Spring Protests and Women's Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from the Egyptian Revolution," Working Papers hal-01309651, HAL.
    8. Binzel, Christine, 2011. "Decline in Social Mobility: Unfulfilled Aspirations among Egypt's Educated Youth," IZA Discussion Papers 6139, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Dorsch, Michael T. & Maarek, Paul, 2015. "Inefficient predation and political transitions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 37-48.
    10. Daniel Treisman, 2011. "Income, Democracy, and the Cunning of Reason," NBER Working Papers 17132, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Education; Human capital; Political protest; Demonstrations; Economic under-performance; Democratization.;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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