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Multinational Firms, Political Competition, and International Trade Policy

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  • Hillman, Arye L
  • Ursprung, Heinrich W

Abstract

This paper considers how the presence of multinational firms influences international trade policy that is determined as the outcome of political competition. Multinational firms have plants to protect in all policy jurisdictions and, hence, are more protectionist than national firms that at least have an interest in free trade in export markets. Nonetheless, because of changed incentives for firms to provide political support for free-trade and protectionist candidates, an increased multinational presence via either merger or direct foreign investment has a liberalizing influence on trade policy. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1993. "Multinational Firms, Political Competition, and International Trade Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(2), pages 347-363, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:34:y:1993:i:2:p:347-63
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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Fałkowski & Alessandro Olper, 2014. "Political competition and policy choices: the evidence from agricultural protection," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 45(2), pages 143-158, March.
    2. Wilfred J. Ethier & Arye L. Hillman, 2017. "The Politics of International Trade," CESifo Working Paper Series 6456, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Long, Cheryl & Yang, Jin & Zhang, Jing, 2015. "Institutional Impact of Foreign Direct Investment in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 31-48.
    4. Grether, Jean-Marie & de Melo, Jaime & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2001. "Who determines Mexican trade policy?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 343-370, April.
    5. David Collie & Hylke Vandenbussche, 2005. "Can Import Tariffs Deter Outward FDI?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 341-362, October.
    6. Hefeker, Carsten & Wunner, Norbert, 2002. "The producer interest in foreign labor standards," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 429-447, September.
    7. Guriev, Sergei & Yakovlev, Evgeny & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2010. "Interest group politics in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 730-748, October.
    8. Olarreaga, Marcelo, 1999. "Foreign-owned Capital and Endogenous Tariffs," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 14, pages 606-624.
    9. Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994. "Foreign Investment with Endogenous Protection," NBER Working Papers 4876, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Polk, Andreas & Schmutzler, Armin & Müller, Adrian, 2014. "Lobbying and the power of multinational firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 209-227.
    11. Lorz, Jens Oliver, 1993. "Der Wettbewerb um international mobiles Kapital: Auswirkungen auf die nationale Finanzpolitik und die intertemporale Kapitalallokation," Kiel Working Papers 608, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    12. Aiura, Hiroshi & Ogawa, Hikaru, 2013. "Unit tax versus ad valorem tax: A tax competition model with cross-border shopping," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 30-38.
    13. Robert Elliott & Ying Zhou, 2013. "Environmental Regulation Induced Foreign Direct Investment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 55(1), pages 141-158, May.
    14. Sajal Lahiri & Yoshiyasu Ono, 1998. "Tax policy on foreign direct investment in the presence of cross-hauling," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 134(2), pages 263-279, June.
    15. Jing, Chao & Kaempfer, William H. & Lowenberg, Anton D., 2003. "A public choice model of the role of multinational firms in international relations," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 131-144, March.
    16. Yasar, Mahmut, 2013. "Political Influence of Exporting and Import-Competing Firms: Evidence from Eastern European and Central Asian Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 154-168.
    17. Blanchard, Emily J., 2014. "What global fragmentation means for the WTO: Article XXIV, behind-the-border concessions, and a new case for WTO limits on investment incentives," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2014-03, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    18. Andreas Polk, 2002. "Lobbying Activities of Multinational Firms," SOI - Working Papers 0205, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2002.
    19. Konishi, Hideo & Saggi, Kamal & Weber, Shlomo, 1999. "Endogenous trade policy under foreign direct investment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 289-308, December.

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