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Czy konkurencja determinuje wielkość inwestycji gmin miejskich w Polsce?

Author

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  • Grażyna Bukowska
  • Joanna Siwińska

Abstract

Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja determinant inwestycji, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem zmiennych dotyczących poziomu konkurencji politycznej oraz zmiennych mierzących samodzielność dochodową samorządów, która traktowana jest jako przybliżenie siły konkurencji pomiędzy ośrodkami lokalnymi, na podstawie danych z 304 gmin miejskich w Polsce z lat 2002-2014. W badaniu udowodniono istotną ujemną zależność między inwestycjami per capita (udział inwestycji w wydatkach ogółem) i poziomem politycznej konkurencji mierzonej indeksem Herfindahla-Hirschmann (HHI). Wzrost politycznej koncentracji (czyli mniejsza konkurencja) sprzyjał wzrostowi inwestycji publicznych na mieszkańca. Ponadto wykazano, że inwestycje są zależne od poziomu decentralizacji fiskalnej. Wyniki sugerują, że wzrost decentralizacji zwiększa udział środków publicznych przeznaczonych na inwestycje.

Suggested Citation

  • Grażyna Bukowska & Joanna Siwińska, 2016. "Czy konkurencja determinuje wielkość inwestycji gmin miejskich w Polsce?," Gospodarka Narodowa, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 6, pages 95-114.
  • Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2016:i:6:p:95-114
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    konkurencja polityczna; wydatki inwestycyjne; autonomia finansowa; samorząd lokalny;

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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