IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment in productive infrastructure?

  • Kappeler, Andreas
  • Solé-Ollé, Albert
  • Stephan, Andreas
  • Välilä, Timo

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of revenue decentralization on the provision of infrastructure at the sub-national level. We estimate the effects of revenue decentralization and earmarked grant financing on the level of sub-national infrastructure investment in 20 European countries over the period 1990–2009. The results are interpreted in light of the predictions of the theory on fiscal federalism. We find that it is sub-national infrastructure investment that increases after revenue decentralization and not investment in redistribution. However, the effect of revenue decentralization is lower the higher the use of earmarked grants to fund infrastructure investment.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268013000190
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 31 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 15-25

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:31:y:2013:i:c:p:15-25
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Rainald Borck & Marco Caliendo & Viktor Steiner, 2007. "Fiscal Competition and the Composition of Public Spending: Theory and Evidence," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 63(2), pages 264-277, June.
  2. Zhuravskaya Ekatherina, 2000. "Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style," EERC Working Paper Series 99-15e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
  3. Santiago Lago-Peñas, . "Capital Grants and Regional Public Investment in Spain: Fungibility of Aid or Crowding-in Effect?," Studies on the Spanish Economy 162, FEDEA.
  4. Sturm, Jan-egbert & Jacobs, Jan & Groote, Peter, 1999. "Output Effects of Infrastructure Investment in the Netherlands, 1853-1913," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 355-380, April.
  5. VALILA, Timo & Kozluk, Tomasz & Mehrotra, Aaron, 2005. "Roads on a downhill? Trends in EU infrastructure investment," EIB Papers 1/2005, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
  6. Kappeler, Andreas & Välilä, Timo, 2008. "Fiscal federalism and the composition of public investment in Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 562-570, September.
  7. David Roodman, 2007. "A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments," Working Papers 125, Center for Global Development.
  8. Romp, Ward & de Haan, Jakob, 2005. "Public capital and economic growth: a critical survey," EIB Papers 2/2005, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
  9. Hayakawa, Kazuhiko, 2007. "Small sample bias properties of the system GMM estimator in dynamic panel data models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 32-38, April.
  10. Sebastian Hauptmeier & Ferdinand Mittermaier & Johannes Rincke, 2008. "Fiscal Competition over Taxes and Public Inputs: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 2499, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2004. "The New Systems Competition," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(1), pages 23-38, 02.
  12. Alejandro Esteller & Albert Solé, 2005. "Does decentralization improve the efficiency in the allocation of public investment? Evidence from Spain," Working Papers 2005/5, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  13. Romero-Ávila, Diego & Strauch, Rolf, 2008. "Public finances and long-term growth in Europe: Evidence from a panel data analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 172-191, March.
  14. Sam Bucovetsky & Michael Smart, 2006. "The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(1), pages 119-144, 01.
  15. Diego Puga, 1996. "The rise and fall of regional inequalities," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20643, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  16. Buettner, Thiess & Wildasin, David E., 2006. "The dynamics of municipal fiscal adjustment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1115-1132, August.
  17. Wallace Oates, 2005. "Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 349-373, August.
  18. Albert Solé-Ollé & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2012. "The dynamic adjustment of local government budgets: does Spain behave differently?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(25), pages 3203-3213, September.
  19. Kiviet, Jan F., 1995. "On bias, inconsistency, and efficiency of various estimators in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 53-78, July.
  20. Aaron Mehrotra & Timo Välilä, 2006. "Public Investment in Europe: Evolution and Determinants in perspective," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 27(4), pages 443-471, December.
  21. Gonzalez Alegre, Juan & Kappeler, Andreas & Kolev, Atanas & Valila, Timo, 2008. "Composition of government investment in Europe: Some forensic evidence," EIB Papers 2/2008, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
  22. Jeffrey Milyo & David M. Primo & Matthew L. Jacobsmeier, 2006. "Estimating the Impact of State Policies and Institutions with Mixed-Level Data," Working Papers 0603, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  23. Faguet, Jean-Paul, 2004. "Does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs?: Evidence from Bolivia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 867-893, March.
  24. Hindriks, Jean J.G. & Peralta, Susana & Weber, Shlomo, 2007. "Competing in Taxes and Investment under Fiscal Equalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 6431, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Weingast, Barry R., 2009. "Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 279-293, May.
  26. Germa Bel & Xavier Fageda, 2009. "Preventing competition because of 'solidarity': rhetoric and reality of airport investments in Spain," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(22), pages 2853-2865.
  27. KEEN, Michael & MARCHAND, Maurice, 1996. "Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending," CORE Discussion Papers 1996001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  28. Giovanni S. F. Bruno, 2005. "Estimation and inference in dynamic unbalanced panel-data models with a small number of individuals," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 5(4), pages 473-500, December.
  29. Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September.
  30. Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese McGuire, 2001. "Do Interregional Transfers Improve the Economic Performance of Poor Regions? The Case of Spain," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 281-296, May.
  31. Rainald Borck, 2006. "Fiscal Competition, Capital-Skill Complementarity, and the Composition of Public Spending," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 61(4), pages 488-499, February.
  32. Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Amy Ellen Schwartz, 1994. "Infrastructure in a Structural Model of Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 4824, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  33. Bucovetsky, S., 2005. "Public input competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1763-1787, September.
  34. Pedro R.D. Bom & Jenny E. Ligthart, 2009. "How Productive is Public Capital? A Meta-Regression Analysis," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0912, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  35. Bun, Maurice J. G. & Kiviet, Jan F., 2003. "On the diminishing returns of higher-order terms in asymptotic expansions of bias," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 145-152, May.
  36. Daniel Montolio & Francesc Trillas, 2011. "Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications," Working Papers 2011/15, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  37. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
  38. Judson, Ruth A. & Owen, Ann L., 1999. "Estimating dynamic panel data models: a guide for macroeconomists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 9-15, October.
  39. Dan Stegarescu, 2005. "Public sector decentralisation: measurement concepts and recent international trends," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 26(3), pages 301-333, September.
  40. Seabright, Paul, 1996. "Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-89, January.
  41. Padovano, Fabio, 2012. "The drivers of interregional policy choices: Evidence from Italy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 324-340.
  42. Estache, Antonio & Sinha, Sarbajit, 1995. "Does decentralization increase spending on public infrastructure?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1457, The World Bank.
  43. Kellermann, Kersten, 2007. "Debt financing of public investment: On a popular misinterpretation of "the golden rule of public sector borrowing"," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1088-1104, December.
  44. Arellano, Manuel & Bond, Stephen, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 277-97, April.
  45. Hulten, Charles R. & Schwab, Robert M., 1997. "A fiscal federalism approach to infrastructure policy," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 139-159, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:31:y:2013:i:c:p:15-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.