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Electoral Rules, Forms of Government and Redistributive Policy: Evidence from Agriculture and Food Policies

Listed author(s):
  • Alessandro Olper
  • Valentina Raimondi

We investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on public policy outcomes using a new dataset on agriculture and food policies from 74 countries over the 1960-2005 period. Using both cross-sectional and panel data analyses we find robust evidence that the specific nature of democratic institutions has important consequences for public policy. Proportional democracies and presidential democracies – compared to majoritarian and parliamentary democracies – give more public support to agriculture and less to food consumers. The magnitude of these constitutional effects are stronger for import-competitive sectors and staple food crops. The effects seem independent from the ideology orientation of governments.

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File URL: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/licos/publications/dp/dp305.pdf
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Paper provided by LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven in its series LICOS Discussion Papers with number 30512.

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Date of creation: 2012
Handle: RePEc:lic:licosd:30512
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