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Asymmetries in Policy Between Exportables and Import-Competing Goods

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  • Anne O. Krueger

Abstract

This paper reexamines current understanding of the political economy of protection. To date, work has centered on determinants of the height of protection and its form - tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and voluntary export restraints. It is argued that examining the structure of protection misses one important piece of evidence - why import-competing industries tend to be more highly protected than industries producing exportables. When the question is cast in this light, a number of new insights emerge, including the importance of earlier protective measures in influencing current protectionist pressures. "Identity bias", whereby political decisions can be asymmetric between winners and losers, depending on whose identity is known, is introduced.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne O. Krueger, 1989. "Asymmetries in Policy Between Exportables and Import-Competing Goods," NBER Working Papers 2904, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2904 Note: ITI IFM
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bela Balassa, 1965. "Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries: An Evaluation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 573-573.
    2. Baldwin, Robert E, 1969. "The Case against Infant-Industry Tariff Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(3), pages 295-305, May/June.
    3. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-985, December.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Raquel Fernandez & Dani Rodrik, 1990. "Why is Trade Reform so Unpopular? On Status Quo Bias in Policy Reforms," NBER Working Papers 3269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
    3. Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry & Mayneris, Florian, 2011. "Public support to clusters: A firm level study of French "Local Productive Systems"," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 108-123, March.
    4. A. U. Santos-Paulino, 2002. "Trade Liberalisation and Export Performance in Selected Developing Countries," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(1), pages 140-164.
    5. L. Alan Winters, 2000. "Trade Liberalisation and Poverty," PRUS Working Papers 07, Poverty Research Unit at Sussex, University of Sussex.
    6. Peter Nedergaard, 2009. "European Union Import Quotas on Chinese Textile and Clothing Exports in 2005: A Panic-Driven Commission or Rational Explanations?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 17-47, March.
    7. Winters, L. Alan, 2000. "Trade, Trade Policy and Poverty: What Are The Links?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2382, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Olper, Alessandro & Raimondi, Valentina, 2013. "Electoral rules, forms of government and redistributive policy: Evidence from agriculture and food policies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 141-158.
    9. Patricio Meller, 2009. "From unilateral liberalization to regional free trade agreements: a Latin America perspective," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 85-103, May.
    10. Levy, Philip I., 1999. "Lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 345-370, April.
    11. Vanberg, Viktor, 1990. "A Constitutional Political Economy Perspective on International Trade," 1990: The Environment, Government Policies, and International Trade Meeting, December 1990, San Diego, CA 50875, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    12. Robert T. Greenbaum & Blair D. Russell & Tricia L. Petras, 2010. "Measuring the Distribution of Economic Development Tax Incentive Intensity," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 24(2), pages 154-168, May.
    13. Peter Nedergaard, 2006. "Market Failures and Government Failures: A Theoretical Model of the Common Agricultural Policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 385-405, June.

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