Asymmetries in Policy Between Exportables and Import-Competing Goods
This paper reexamines current understanding of the political economy of protection. To date, work has centered on determinants of the height of protection and its form - tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and voluntary export restraints. It is argued that examining the structure of protection misses one important piece of evidence - why import-competing industries tend to be more highly protected than industries producing exportables. When the question is cast in this light, a number of new insights emerge, including the importance of earlier protective measures in influencing current protectionist pressures. "Identity bias", whereby political decisions can be asymmetric between winners and losers, depending on whose identity is known, is introduced.
|Date of creation:||Mar 1989|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as The Political Economy of International Trade: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Baldwin. edited by Ronald W. Jones and Anne O. Krueger, pp. 161-178. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
- Bela Balassa, 1965. "Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries: An Evaluation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 573.
- Baldwin, Robert E, 1969. "The Case against Infant-Industry Tariff Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(3), pages 295-305, May/June.
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