Political institutions behind good governance
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- Bartolini, David & Santolini, Raffaella, 2017. "Political institutions behind good governance," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 68-85.
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More about this item
Keywords
electoral rule; government eectiveness; political system; regulatory quality;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2014-10-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAW-2014-10-22 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-POL-2014-10-22 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2014-10-22 (Regulation)
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