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Political institutions behind good governance

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  • Raffaella SANTOLINI

    () (Universit… Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali)

  • David BARTOLINI

    (Universit… Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali)

Abstract

The present work looks at the role of political institutions - political regimes and electoral rules - in determining the performance of the government to define and implement sound policies for the economy. The results of the empirical investigation on a panel of 80 democracies over the period 1996-2011, show an important impact of the political regime on the performance of the government - the presidential regimes reduces the quality of the government -, while electoral rules do not matter. However, the analysis shows that the interaction between political regimes and electoral rules plays a crucial role for the quality of the government. In particular, a presidential regime improves the government performance when associated with a majoritarian rule, while worsens it when combined with a proportional rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Raffaella SANTOLINI & David BARTOLINI, 2014. "Political institutions behind good governance," Working Papers 405, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
  • Handle: RePEc:anc:wpaper:405
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    electoral rule; government eectiveness; political system; regulatory quality;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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