Fiscal autonomy and quality of governance in OECD countries
Using a panel of 24 OECD countries, we study the link between the autonomy of sub-national governments and the quality of governance of a country. The results show that fiscal autonomy worsens citizens' perceptions of governance quality. In particular, the delegation of policy responsibilities to the regional level produces a robust negative effect on quality.
Volume (Year): 33 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kyriacou, Andreas P. & Roca-Sagalés, Oriol, 2011. "Fiscal decentralization and government quality in the OECD," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 191-193, June.
- Andreas P. Kyriacoua & Oriol Roca-Sagalésb, 2010.
"Fiscal and Political Decentralization and Government Quality,"
International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU
paper1005, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Andreas P Kyriacou & Oriol Roca-Sagalés, 2011. "Fiscal and political decentralization and government quality," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 29(2), pages 204-223, April.
- Andreas P Kyriacou & Oriol Roca-SagalÃ©s, 2011. "Fiscal and Political Decentralization and Government Quality," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 29(2), pages 204-223, April.
- Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2003.
"Decentralization and Political Institutions,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3857, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ruben Enikolopov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," Working Papers w0065, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Ruben Enikolopov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," Economics Working Papers 0045, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Cai, Hongbin & Treisman, Daniel, 2004. "State corroding federalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 819-843, March.
- Seabright, Paul, 1996.
"Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-89, January.
- Seabright, Paul, 1994. "Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 889, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Breusch, Trevor & Ward, Michael B & Nguyen, Hoa & Kompas, Tom, 2010. "On the fixed-effects vector decomposition," MPRA Paper 21452, University Library of Munich, Germany.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-13-00033. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.