Political economy of agricultural policy
In: Handbook of Agricultural Economics
Explanations are provided for why governments do as they do in agriculture. Alternative frameworks are assessed to explain government policy including collective action and politician-voter interaction models. Several key patterns of policies are analyzed including the "developmental paradox" where the tendency for support to agriculture increases with GDP and decreases with the proportion of the population in agriculture. The chapter also assesses why governments employ inefficient policy instruments in agriculture, why there appears to be a status quo bias, and why policy is biased against trade. Particular emphasis is given on the interaction between redistributive and growth-promoting policies.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|This chapter was published in: ||This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Agricultural Economics with number
4-36.||Handle:|| RePEc:eee:hagchp:4-36||Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:hagchp:4-36. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.