IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v93y2003i1p256-264.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Redistributive Promises and the Adoption of Economic Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Sanjay Jain
  • Sharun W. Mukand

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Sanjay Jain & Sharun W. Mukand, 2003. "Redistributive Promises and the Adoption of Economic Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 256-264, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:1:p:256-264
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282803321455269
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/000282803321455269
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mariano Tommasi & Andres Velasco, 1996. "Where are we in the political economy of reform?," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 187-238.
    2. James A. Robinson & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 126-130, May.
    3. Jain, Sanjay & Sharun Mukand, 2003. "Public Opinion and the Dynamics of Reform," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 114, Royal Economic Society.
    4. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    5. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
    6. Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529.
    7. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    8. Cukierman, Alex & Tommasi, Mariano, 1998. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 180-197, March.
    9. Sebastian Edwards & Daniel Lederman, 1998. "The Political Economy of Unilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Chile," NBER Working Papers 6510, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cason, Timothy N. & Mui, Vai-Lam, 2005. "Uncertainty and resistance to reform in laboratory participation games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 708-737, September.
    2. Liu, Qijun, 2007. "How to improve government performance?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1198-1206, December.
    3. Jain, Sanjay & Majumdar, Sumon & Mukand, Sharun W, 2014. "Walk the line: Conflict, state capacity and the political dynamics of reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 150-166.
    4. Geir Asheim & Carl Claussen & Tore Nilssen, 2006. "Majority voting leads to unanimity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 91-110, December.
    5. Paetzel, Fabian & Sausgruber, Rupert & Traub, Stefan, 2014. "Social preferences and voting on reform: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 36-55.
    6. Dalibor Eterovic, 2009. "Policy Reform Under Electoral Uncertainty," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 546, Central Bank of Chile.
    7. Sanjay Jain, 2017. "Worker retraining and transfer payments: The political economy of social protection," WIDER Working Paper Series 044, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    8. Arghya Ghosh & Kieron Meagher, 2011. "The Political Economy of Infrastructure Investment: Competition, Collusion and Uncertainty," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2011-556, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    9. repec:oup:wbecrv:v:31:y:2017:i:2:p:329-350. is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Jain, Sanjay & Sharun Mukand, 2003. "Public Opinion and the Dynamics of Reform," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 114, Royal Economic Society.
    11. Joao Ricardo Faria & Peter McAdam, 2013. "From Social Contract to Arab Spring: Macroeconomic Adjustment under Regime Change," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0813, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    12. De Borger, Bruno & Proost, Stef, 2012. "A political economy model of road pricing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 79-92.
    13. Ethan Ilzetzki, 2015. "A Positive Theory of Tax Reform," Discussion Papers 1526, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    14. Eduardo Lora & Mauricio Olivera, 2005. "The Electoral Consequences of the Washington Consensus," ECONOMIA JOURNAL, THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 1-61, January.
    15. Rubinchik, Anna & Wang, Ruqu, 2008. "A note on redistributive fairness and economic reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 447-452, June.
    16. Jain, Sanjay & Majumdar, Sumon & Mukand, Sharun, 2011. "Walk the Line: Conflict, State Capacity and the Political Dynamics of Reform," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 274552, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    17. Dalibor S. Eterovic, 2011. "Institutional Bias towards the Status Quo," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(3), pages 489-514, September.
    18. Veldkamp, Laura, 2009. "Learning about reform: Time-varying support for structural adjustment," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 192-206, March.
    19. Jain, Sanjay & Majumdar, Sumon, 2016. "State capacity, redistributive compensation and the political economy of economic policy reform," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 462-473.
    20. Francesco Passarelli, 2011. "Risky Political Changes: Rational Choice vs Prospect Theory," ISLA Working Papers 39, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    21. Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez & Barbara Cunha & Riccardo Trezzi, 2017. "When Winners Feel Like Losers: Evidence from an Energy Subsidy Reform," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 31(2), pages 329-350.
    22. Eduardo Lora & Mauricio Olivera, 2005. "Repercusiones electorales del Consenso de Washington," Research Department Publications 4406, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    23. Heather Congdon Fors, 2016. "Citizens' support for Economic Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 84(3), pages 343-363, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:1:p:256-264. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael P. Albert). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.