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The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Production

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  • James Rogers

Abstract

It seems obvious that divided governments should produce less legislation than unified governments. Yet studies have consistently failed to find such an effect. Because almost all existing studies focus on the experience of the U.S. national government, the data have limited analysis to a consideration of executive–legislative division and ignore the impact of division between bicameral chambers. The state-level data set employed in this study is not so limited. The results show that divided legislatures decrease the production of laws by almost 30%. Nonetheless, consistent with previous studies using national-level data, executive–legislative divisions have no impact of legislative production. The reason for this asymmetry is theoretically motivated. Additional hypotheses of interest are also tested, including whether Republican-controlled legislative chambers are more “conservative” than Democratic chambers in the sense of producing fewer laws than their Democratic counterparts. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • James Rogers, 2005. "The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Production," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 217-233, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:123:y:2005:i:1:p:217-233
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-0261-5
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    Cited by:

    1. William Bianco & Regina Smyth, 2020. "The Bicameral Roots of Congressional Deadlock: Analyzing Divided Government Through the Lens of Majority Rule," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1712-1727, September.
    2. Below, Amy, 2013. "Obstacles in energy security: An analysis of congressional and presidential framing in the United States," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 860-868.
    3. Anabel Zárate-Marco & Jaime Vallés-Giménez, 2015. "Environmental tax and productivity in a decentralized context: new findings on the Porter hypothesis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 313-339, October.
    4. Bernecker, Andreas, 2016. "Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 24-38.
    5. Sung Eun Jung & Yongmin Kim, 2022. "Party Competition Structure and Legislative Productivity of Local Councils: From the 4th to 6th Local Councils in Korea," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-15, February.
    6. Mamadou Boukari & Etienne Farvaque & Daniel Cakpo-Tozo, 2019. "“Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!†Popularity Gains as an Incentive to Legislate Frantically?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(2), pages 1488-1507.
    7. Gregory Randolph, 2011. "The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 265-286, September.
    8. Im, Hyun Joong & Kim, Jiyeon & Ryu, Dean, 2023. "Unified government and the value of cash holdings," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PC).
    9. Schelker, Mark, 2018. "Lame ducks and divided government: How voters control the unaccountable," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 131-144.
    10. Hayashida, Sherilyn & La Croix, Sumner & Coffman, Makena, 2021. "Understanding changes in electric vehicle policies in the U.S. states, 2010–2018," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 211-223.
    11. Gregory M. Randolph, 2014. "Institutions and entrepreneurial productivity in the American states," Chapters, in: Robert F. Salvino Jr. & Michael T. Tasto & Gregory M. Randolph (ed.), Entrepreneurial Action, Public Policy, and Economic Outcomes, chapter 6, pages 100-116, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Peter Calcagno & Joshua C. Hall, 2020. "Formal and informal constraints on state government and economic freedom," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(1), pages 801-806.
    13. Peter Calcagno & Edward Lopez, 2012. "Divided we vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 517-536, June.
    14. Steven Callander & Keith Krehbiel, 2014. "Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(4), pages 819-834, October.
    15. Joshua Y. Lerner, 2018. "Getting the message across: evaluating think tank influence in Congress," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 347-366, June.
    16. Dawood Ashraf & Mohsin Khawaja & M. Ishaq Bhatti, 2022. "Raising capital amid economic policy uncertainty: an empirical investigation," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 8(1), pages 1-32, December.
    17. Byung‐Jae Lee & Tae Wan Kim & Jaekwon Suh & O. Fiona Yap, 2021. "Local government performance and democratic consolidation: Explaining ordinance proposal in Busan Metropolitan Council," Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 15-41, January.
    18. Jungbu Kim, 2010. "Political Institutions and Public R&D Expenditures in Democratic Countries," Working Papers EMS_2010_16, Research Institute, International University of Japan.
    19. Anabel Zárate-Marco & Jaime Vallés-Giménez, 2012. "The cost of regulation in a decentralized context: the case of the Spanish regions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 185-203, February.
    20. Andreas Bernecker, 2014. "Divided We Reform? Evidence from US Welfare Policies," CESifo Working Paper Series 4564, CESifo.

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