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Divided we vote


  • Peter Calcagno
  • Edward Lopez



No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Calcagno & Edward Lopez, 2012. "Divided we vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 517-536, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:151:y:2012:i:3:p:517-536
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9756-9

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
    2. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1121-1161, December.
    3. Sam Peltzman, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(2), pages 327-361.
    4. Hamilton, Bruce W., 1983. "The flypaper effect and other anomalies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 347-361, December.
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:88:y:1994:i:04:p:811-828_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:92:y:1998:i:04:p:759-774_21 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
    8. repec:cup:apsrev:v:94:y:2000:i:01:p:37-57_22 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Reed, W. Robert, 2006. "Democrats, republicans, and taxes: Evidence that political parties matter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 725-750, May.
    10. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:02:p:373-398_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:cup:apsrev:v:88:y:1994:i:02:p:304-316_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Rosenthal, Howard & Alesina, Alberto, 1989. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," Scholarly Articles 4553031, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    13. repec:hrv:faseco:34222831 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Noel D. Campbell & R. Zachary Finney & David T. Mitchell, 2007. "Hunting The Whale: More Evidence on State Government Leviathans," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 566-580, October.
    15. James Rogers, 2005. "The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Production," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 217-233, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Bjørnskov & Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "The size and scope of government in the US states: does party ideology matter?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(4), pages 687-714, August.
    2. Joshua C. Hall & Dean Stansel & Danko Tarabar, 2015. "Economic Freedom Studies at the State Level: A Survey," Working Papers 15-07, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    3. Christian Bjørnskov & Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Political Ideology and Economic Freedom Across Canadian Provinces," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 143-166.
    4. Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2015. "Moderating Government," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 415-440, September.
    5. Niklas Potrafke, 2017. "Government Ideology and Economic Policy-Making in the United States," CESifo Working Paper Series 6444, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item


    Divided government; Limited government; Midterm cycles; Split ticket voting; American states; D72; E62; H71;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue


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