IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v94y2000i01p37-57_22.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections

Author

Listed:
  • Mebane, Walter R.

Abstract

Voters have been coordinating their choices for president and House of Representatives in recent presidential election years, with each voter using a strategy that features policy moderation. Coordination is defined as a noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium among voters, in which each voter has both common knowledge and private information about the election outcome. Stochastic choice models estimated using individual-level NES data from 1976–96 support coordination versus a model in which voters act nonstrategically to moderate policy. The empirical coordinating model satisfies the fixed-point condition that defines the common knowledge expectation voters have about the outcome in the theoretical equilibrium. The proportion of voters who split their ticket in order to balance the House with the president has been small but large enough to affect election outcomes. Moderation has usually been based on voters' expectations that the president will be at least an equal of the House in determining postelection policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Mebane, Walter R., 2000. "Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(1), pages 37-57, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:94:y:2000:i:01:p:37-57_22
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S000305540022008X/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Peter Calcagno & Edward Lopez, 2012. "Divided we vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 517-536, June.
    2. Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2007. "A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple Elections, Fourth Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-025, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Aug 2007.
    3. Schelker, Mark, 2018. "Lame ducks and divided government: How voters control the unaccountable," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 131-144.
    4. Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2011. "A Structural Model Of Turnout And Voting In Multiple Elections," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-245, April.
    5. Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Do Voters Vote Sincerely? Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 03 Jan 2007.
    6. Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Do Voters Vote Sincerely?," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Knight, Brian, 2017. "An Econometric Evaluation of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 12(2), pages 205-239, September.
    8. Amine El Haimar & Joost Santos, 2015. "A stochastic recovery model of influenza pandemic effects on interdependent workforce systems," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 77(2), pages 987-1011, June.
    9. Maurice Kugler & Howard Rosental, 2000. "Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separtion of political powers in Colombia," Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo 002117, Fedesarrollo.
    10. Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2004. "Do Citizens Vote Sincerely (If They Vote at All)? Theory and Evidence from U. S. National Elections," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    11. Kugler, Maurice & Rosenthal, Howard, 2000. "Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separation of political powers in Colombia," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0018, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:94:y:2000:i:01:p:37-57_22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Keith Waters (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.