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Party does not matter: Unified government and midterm elections

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  • Jacob Holt

Abstract

Objective This article seeks to understand the effect unified government has on seat loss in midterm elections. Methods Using data from the 1950 to 2018 midterm elections, I use Ordinary Least Squares regression models to determine the effect of unified government on seat loss. Results I find that unified government increases the number of seats a president's party loses during a midterm election. In addition, unified government reduces the number of seats saved by presidential approval and increases surge and decline effects. Conclusion Unified government explains why Democrats have traditionally performed worse during midterm elections. The results also indicate that rather than a surge and decline, midterm elections are a counter‐surge to the surge in support the president's party receives in the previous presidential election.

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  • Jacob Holt, 2022. "Party does not matter: Unified government and midterm elections," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 103(1), pages 168-180, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:103:y:2022:i:1:p:168-180
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.13112
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    1. Bloom, Howard S. & Price, H. Douglas, 1975. "Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions: the Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 1240-1254, December.
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    3. Tufte, Edward R., 1975. "Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 812-826, September.
    4. Carson, Jamie L. & Engstrom, Erik J. & Roberts, Jason M., 2007. "Candidate Quality, the Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 289-301, May.
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