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Moderating Government

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco De Sinopoli

    () (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

  • Leo Ferraris

    (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

  • Giovanna Iannantuoni

    () (University of Milano-Bicocca)

Abstract

We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2011. "Moderating Government," Working Papers 09/2011, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ver:wpaper:09/2011
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    File URL: http://dse.univr.it//workingpapers/moderatinggov12.pdf
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    Other versions of this item:

    • Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2011. "Moderating Government," Working Papers 211, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2011.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
    2. repec:hrv:faseco:34222831 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2017. "A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting," Working Papers 01/2017, University of Verona, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting; proportional rule; majority; parliament.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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