IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ver/wpaper/09-2011.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Moderating Government

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco De Sinopoli

    (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

  • Leo Ferraris

    (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

  • Giovanna Iannantuoni

    (University of Milano-Bicocca)

Abstract

We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2011. "Moderating Government," Working Papers 09/2011, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ver:wpaper:09/2011
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dse.univr.it//workingpapers/moderatinggov12.pdf
    File Function: First version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    • Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2011. "Moderating Government," Working Papers 211, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2011.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
    2. Cho, Seok-Ju, 2014. "Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 108(2), pages 281-296, May.
    3. Peter Calcagno & Edward Lopez, 2012. "Divided we vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 517-536, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2018. "A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(3), pages 493-512, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christian Bjørnskov & Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "The size and scope of government in the US states: does party ideology matter?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(4), pages 687-714, August.
    2. Niklas Potrafke, 2018. "Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 145-207, January.
    3. Niklas Potrafke, 2017. "Government Ideology and Economic Policy-Making in the United States," CESifo Working Paper Series 6444, CESifo.
    4. Peter Spáč, 2021. "Pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 479-501, September.
    5. Umeno, Luis Gustavo & Bugarin, Maurício Soares, 2008. "Electoral Control in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 28(1), May.
    6. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2021. "Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    7. Francisco Jose Veiga & Linda Goncalves Veiga, 2010. "The impact of local and national economic conditions on legislative election results," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(13), pages 1727-1734.
    8. Kawamura, Kohei, 2008. "Communication for Public Goods," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-25, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    9. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2011. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 497-513, December.
    10. Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Do Voters Vote Sincerely?," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    11. Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2004. "Bad politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 759-782, March.
    12. Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2011. "A Structural Model Of Turnout And Voting In Multiple Elections," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-245, April.
    13. Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2013. "Electing a parliament," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 715-737, March.
    14. Zohal Hessami, 2016. "How Do Voters React to Complex Choices in a Direct Democracy? Evidence from Switzerland," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 263-293, May.
    15. Alvaro Forteza & Juan S. Pereyra, 2021. "Separation of powers with ideological parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(3), pages 333-382, July.
    16. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
    17. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Sincere Lobby Formation," Working Papers 2072/151545, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    18. Ted Hayduk, 2022. "Association membership, election cycles, and political donation patterns," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 359-384, December.
    19. Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger, 2010. "Political stability and fiscal policy: time series evidence for the Swiss federal level since 1849," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 505-534, September.
    20. César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting; proportional rule; majority; parliament.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ver:wpaper:09/2011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael Reiter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/isverit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.