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Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation

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  • CHO, SEOK-JU

Abstract

This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in multicandidate competition. Applying the equilibrium concept to the model, I find that PR promotes representation of small parties in general, even when voters are strategic. However, the median voter plays a critical role in shaping policy outcomes, which reflects the majoritarian nature of parliamentary policy making rules. Thus, PR may not be incompatible with the majoritarian vision of representative democracy if voters’ main concern is policy outcomes.

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  • Cho, Seok-Ju, 2014. "Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 108(2), pages 281-296, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:108:y:2014:i:02:p:281-296_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Matías Núñez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 346-374, April.
    2. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Iannantuoni, Giovanna & Manzoni, Elena & Pimienta, Carlos, 2019. "Proportional representation with uncertainty," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 18-23.
    3. Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 191-220, February.
    4. Meir Kalech & Moshe Koppel & Abraham Diskin & Eli Rohn & Inbal Roshanski, 2020. "Formation of Parties and Coalitions in Multiple Referendums," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 723-745, August.
    5. Paolo Balduzzi & Sandro Brusco, 2019. "Proportional Systems with Free Entry. A Citizen-Candidate Model," Department of Economics Working Papers 19-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    6. Hangartner, Dominik & Ruiz, Nelson A. & Tukiainen, Janne, 2019. "Open or Closed? How List Type Affects Electoral Performance, Candidate Selection, and Campaign Effort," Working Papers 120, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    7. Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2015. "Moderating Government," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 415-440, September.
    8. Kemal Kıvanç Aköz & Alexei Zakharov, 2023. "Electoral turnout with divided opposition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 439-475, April.
    9. David P Baron, 2018. "Elections and durable governments in parliamentary governments," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 74-118, January.

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