IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-03335595.html

Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation

Author

Listed:
  • Hayrullah Dindar

    (Murat Sertel Center - Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies - Istanbul Bilgi University)

  • Gilbert Laffond

    (Murat Sertel Center - Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies - Istanbul Bilgi University)

  • Jean Lainé

    (LIRSA - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en sciences de l'action - Cnam - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [Cnam])

Abstract

We consider two-tiers elections based on closed party-list proportional representation (PLPR), where party platforms involving multiple dichotomous issues are endogenously determined by their supporters’ preferences (via issue-wise simple majority voting). Assuming that voters compare platforms according to the criterion of the Hamming distance and provided a high enough number of voters and issues, we show that the outcome of PLPR may be Pareto dominated by the multiple referendum outcome defined as the issue-wise majority will in the whole electorate. We refer to this situation as the PLPR paradox. We characterize the set of party platforms for which the PLPR paradox is possible. We also investigate several restrictions upon voting situations that may be sufficient for avoiding the paradox.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation," Post-Print hal-03335595, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03335595
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-020-09713-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Arnold Cédrick SOH VOUTSA, 2020. "Approval Voting & Majority Judgment in Weighted Representative Democracy," Thema Working Papers 2020-15, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03335595. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.