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Proportional Representation with Uncertainty

Listed author(s):
  • Francesco De Sinopoli
  • Giovanna Iannantuoni
  • Elena Manzoni
  • Carlos Pimienta

We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented.

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File URL: http://dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper288.pdf
File Function: First version, 2014
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Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 288.

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Length: 17
Date of creation: Dec 2014
Date of revision: Dec 2014
Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:288
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  1. Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
  2. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
  3. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
  4. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967.
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