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Proportional Representation with Uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco De Sinopoli
  • Giovanna Iannantuoni
  • Elena Manzoni
  • Carlos Pimienta

Abstract

We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Elena Manzoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2014. "Proportional Representation with Uncertainty," Working Papers 288, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2014.
  • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:288
    as

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    File URL: http://dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper288.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2014
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
    2. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
    3. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    4. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967.
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:02:p:405-422_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(02), pages 405-422, June.
    7. repec:cup:apsrev:v:104:y:2010:i:04:p:698-719_00 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Proportional Election; Strategic Voting; Legislative Bargaining;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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