A Two-Party System under the Proportional Rule is Possible: Strategic Voting in the Lab
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More about this item
KeywordsProportional representation; strategic voting; polarization; political compromise; laboratory experiment; information;
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2018-05-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2018-05-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2018-05-21 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2018-05-21 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2018-05-21 (Positive Political Economics)
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