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Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study


  • André Blais

    (Université de Montréal [Montréal])

  • Jean-François Laslier

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Nicolas Sauger

    (CEVIPOF - Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Karine Van Der Straeten

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics)


We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked preferences we find that One-round voting and Two-round voting generate significant path dependent effects, whereas Approval voting elects the Condorcet winner and Single Transferable vote (Hare system) does not. From the analysis of individual data we conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too involved, in which case they rely on simple heuristics.

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  • André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2008. "Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study," Working Papers hal-00335046, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00335046
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Virginie Béhue & Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2009. "La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 75(4), pages 503-516.
    2. Jean-François Laslier, 2004. "Strategic Approval Voting in a large electorate," Working Papers hal-00242909, HAL.
    3. Forsythe, R. & Myerson, R. & Rietz, T. & Weber, R., 1991. "An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories," Working Papers 91-31, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:01:p:102-114_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. André Blais & Simon Labbé-St-Vincent & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2008. "Vote choice in one round and two round elections," Working Papers hal-00335060, HAL.
    7. Alvarez, R. Michael & Nagler, Jonathan, 2000. "A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(01), pages 57-75, January.
    8. Fisher, Stephen D., 2004. "Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting: The Role of Rational Choice," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(01), pages 152-166, January.
    9. André Blais, 2002. "Why Is there So Little Strategic Voting in Canadian Plurality Rule Elections?," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 50(3), pages 445-454, August.
    10. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Annie Laurent & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2007. "One Round versus Two Round Elections: An Experimental Study," Working Papers hal-00243055, HAL.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "In Silico Voting Experiments," Working Papers hal-00390376, HAL.

    More about this item


    voting behavior.; comportement de vote; Elections; comportement de vote.;

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