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The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting

Listed author(s):
  • Matias Nunez

    ()

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise - CNRS)

We show that Approval voting need not trigger sincere behavior in equilibrium of Poisson voting games and hence might lead a strategic voter to skip a candidate preferred to his worst preferred approved candidate. We identify two main rationales for these violations of sincerity. First, if a candidate has no votes, a voter might skip him. Notwithstanding, we provide sufficient conditions on the voters' preference intensities to remove this sort of insincerity. On the contrary, if the candidate gets a positive share of the votes, a voter might skip him solely on the basis of his ordinal preferences. This second type of insincerity is a consequence of the correlation of the candidates' scores. The incentives for sincerity of rank scoring rules are also discussed.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00917101.

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Date of creation: Sep 2013
Publication status: Published in Economic Theory, Springer Verlag, 2013, pp.0938-2259. <10.1007/s00199-013-0775-x>
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00917101
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-013-0775-x
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00917101
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