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The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting

  • Matias Nunez

    ()

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS : UMR8184 - Université de Cergy Pontoise)

We show that Approval voting need not trigger sincere behavior in equilibrium of Poisson voting games and hence might lead a strategic voter to skip a candidate preferred to his worst preferred approved candidate. We identify two main rationales for these violations of sincerity. First, if a candidate has no votes, a voter might skip him. Notwithstanding, we provide sufficient conditions on the voters' preference intensities to remove this sort of insincerity. On the contrary, if the candidate gets a positive share of the votes, a voter might skip him solely on the basis of his ordinal preferences. This second type of insincerity is a consequence of the correlation of the candidates' scores. The incentives for sincerity of rank scoring rules are also discussed.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00917101.

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Date of creation: Sep 2013
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Publication status: Published, Economic Theory, 2013, 0938-2259
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00917101
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  24. Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 2003. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Working Papers 03-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  25. Miguel Ballester & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2009. "Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 477-494, September.
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