Gains from manipulating social choice rules
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Volume (Year): 40 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2004.
"Minimal manipulability: Unanimity and Nondictatorship,"
005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Minimal manipulability: Unanimity and nondictatorship," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 675-691, August.
- Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 239-254, May.
- Benoit, Jean-Pierre, 2000. "The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a simple proof," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 319-322, December.
- Peter Fristrup & Hans Keiding, 1998. "Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 455-467.
- Saari, Donald G, 1990. " Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
- David A. Smith, 1999. "Manipulability measures of common social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 639-661.
- Ehlers,L. & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2000.
"Threshold Strategy-Proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems,"
038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2004. "Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 103-116, October.
- Lepelley, Dominique & Mbih, Boniface, 1987. "The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 311-315.
- Schummer, James, 2004. "Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 154-170, July.
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