Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
This paper investigates the number of profiles at which a social choice function is manipulable. It is found that there is a lower bound on this number when the social choice function is assumed non-dictatorial. Also, any number between this lower bound and the maximal number of profiles may be obtained as the number of manipulable profiles of some social choice function.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 15 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: 30 November 1993 / Accepted: 14 April 1997|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|