IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/unm/umamet/2004026.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity

Author

Listed:
  • Maus, S.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Peters, H.J.M.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Storcken, A.J.A.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function is manipulable. The lower bound is derived when there are three alternatives to choose from. Examples of social choice functions attaining the lower bound are given. We conjecture that these examples are in fact all minimally manipulable social choice functions. Since some of these examples are even Pareto optimal, we have also derived the lower bound for Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions. Some of the minimally manipulable Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions can be interpreted as status quo voting.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was b
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Maus, S. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A., 2004. "Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2004026
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2004026
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/857952/guid-4790b705-feee-4324-a09e-7c5507702456-ASSET1.0.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.26481/umamet.2004026?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lok, R.B. & Romero Morales, D. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2005. "The agents-are-substitutes property in continuous generalized assignment problems," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    2. Peter Fristrup & Hans Keiding, 1998. "Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 455-467.
    3. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Minimal manipulability: Unanimity and nondictatorship," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 675-691, August.
    4. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 533-544, July.
    2. , & , & ,, 2014. "Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
    3. Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2014. "Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 43-49.
    4. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2014. "Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 26-39.
    5. Lok, R.B. & Romero Morales, D. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2005. "The agents-are-substitutes property in continuous generalized assignment problems," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    6. ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars, 2013. "An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche 2013-12, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    7. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers, 2022. "An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 50-60, March.
    8. Mostapha Diss, 2015. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 229(1), pages 347-376, June.
    9. Bednay, Dezső & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2019. "Dictatorship versus manipulability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 72-76.
    10. ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "(Minimally) 'epsilon'-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche 2012-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    11. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2015. "Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 165-185.
    12. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2012. "(Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche 04-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    13. Ehud Friedgut & Gil Kalai & Noam Nisan, 2008. "Elections Can be Manipulated Often," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002416, David K. Levine.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 533-544, July.
    2. Lok, R.B. & Romero Morales, D. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2005. "The agents-are-substitutes property in continuous generalized assignment problems," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Bednay, Dezső & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2019. "Dictatorship versus manipulability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 72-76.
    4. Hans Peters & Souvik Roy & Ton Storcken, 2012. "On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 399-429, July.
    5. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
    6. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2020. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 523-548, June.
    7. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Minimal manipulability: Unanimity and nondictatorship," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 675-691, August.
    8. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 239-254, May.
    9. Pritchard, Geoffrey & Wilson, Mark C., 2009. "Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 35-57, July.
    10. Erlanson, Albin & Szwagrzak, Karol, 2013. "Strategy-Proof Package Assignment," Working Papers 2013:43, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    11. Bock, Hans-Hermann & Day, William H. E. & McMorris, F. R., 1998. "Consensus rules for committee elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 219-232, May.
    12. Pablo Guillen & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2021. "Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 650-668, June.
    13. Marco LiCalzi, 2022. "Bipartite choices," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 45(2), pages 551-568, December.
    14. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007. "Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 269-300, November.
    15. John C. McCabe-Dansted & Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "Exploratory Analysis of Similarities Between Social Choice Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 77-107, January.
    16. James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Aleskerov, Fuad & Karabekyan, Daniel & Sanver, M. Remzi & Yakuba, Vyacheslav, 2012. "On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-73.
    18. Lirong Xia, 2020. "How Likely Are Large Elections Tied?," Papers 2011.03791, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    19. Dindar, Hayrullah & Lainé, Jean, 2017. "Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 105-107.
    20. Barbera, S. & Bossert, W. & Pattanaik, P.K., 2001. "Ranking Sets of Objects," Cahiers de recherche 2001-02, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2004026. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Andrea Willems or Leonne Portz (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/meteonl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.