Elections Can be Manipulated Often
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Other versions of this item:
- Ehud Friedgut & Gil Kalai & Noam Nisan, 2008. "Elections Can be Manipulated Often," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002121, David K. Levine.
- Ehud Friedgut & Gil Kalai & Noam Nisan, 2008. "Elections Can be Manipulated Often," Discussion Paper Series dp481, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
References listed on IDEAS
- Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2007. "Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 247-269, September.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-10-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-10-21 (Positive Political Economics)
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