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Elections Can be Manipulated Often

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  • Ehud Friedgut
  • Gil Kalai
  • Noam Nisan

Abstract

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method between at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method between 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.

Suggested Citation

  • Ehud Friedgut & Gil Kalai & Noam Nisan, 2008. "Elections Can be Manipulated Often," Discussion Paper Series dp481, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp481
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    1. Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2007. "Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 247-269, September.
    2. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    3. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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