How Likely Are Large Elections Tied?
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Cited by:
- Niclas Boehmer & Robert Bredereck & Piotr Faliszewski & Rolf Niedermeier, 2022. "A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Robustness of (Real-World) Election Winners," Papers 2208.13760, arXiv.org.
- Lirong Xia, 2021. "The Smoothed Satisfaction of Voting Axioms," Papers 2106.01947, arXiv.org.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-POL-2020-11-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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