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Voting as a Credible Threat

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  • Londregan, John

    (Princeton U)

  • Vindigni, Andrea

Abstract

We offer a rationale for elections that take place in the shadow of power. Factions unhappy with policy can threaten violence. But when they lack common knowledge about (i) one another's rationality, and(ii) their chances of victory at arms, then mutual overconfidence can precipitate civil war. We argue that elections can clarify the likely consequences of violence, and so facilitate peaceful resolution. Our theory is based on the recognition that both voting and fighting are intrinsically correlated actions: individuals who undertake the individually irrational act of voting are unusually prone the individually irrational act of voluntary combat.

Suggested Citation

  • Londregan, John & Vindigni, Andrea, 2006. "Voting as a Credible Threat," Papers 10-04-2006, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:prirpe:10-04-2006
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    5. Anjali Thomas Bohlken, 2010. "Coups, Elections and the Predatory State," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(2), pages 169-215, April.
    6. Hugh-Jones, David & Reinstein, David, 2014. "Exclude the Bad Actors or Learn About The Group," Economics Discussion Papers 10010, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    7. Aditya Bhave & Christopher Kingston, 2010. "Military coups and the consequences of durable de facto power: the case of Pakistan," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 51-76, February.

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