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Military coups and the consequences of durable de facto power: the case of Pakistan

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  • Aditya Bhave
  • Christopher Kingston

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  • Aditya Bhave & Christopher Kingston, 2010. "Military coups and the consequences of durable de facto power: the case of Pakistan," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 51-76, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:11:y:2010:i:1:p:51-76
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-009-0068-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Greif, Avner & Laitin, David D., 2004. "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 633-652, November.
    2. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2010. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-42, January.
    4. Douglass C. North, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter.
    5. John Londregan & Andrea Vindigni, 2006. "Voting as a Credible Threat," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 18, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    6. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422.
    7. Londregan, John & Vindigni, Andrea, 2006. "Voting as a Credible Threat," Papers 10-04-2006, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
    8. Robert Bates & Avner Greif & Smita Singh, 2002. "Organizing Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(5), pages 599-628, October.
    9. Przeworski,Adam, 2003. "States and Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521828048.
    10. James D. Fearon, 2011. "Self-Enforcing Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(4), pages 1661-1708.
    11. Przeworski,Adam, 2003. "States and Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521535243.
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    Cited by:

    1. Karim Khan, 2013. "Distributive consideration in institutional change: the case of Zia’s Islamization policy in Pakistan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 139-165, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Military; Coups; Pakistan; N40; P00; H56;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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