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Voting as a Credible Threat

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  • John Londregan
  • Andrea Vindigni

Abstract

We offer a rationale for elections that take place in the shadow of power. Factions unhappy with policy can threaten violence. But when they lack common knowledge about (i) one another's rationality, and (ii) their chances of victory at arms, mutual overconfidence can precipitate civil war. We argue that elections can clarify the likely consequences of violence, and so facilitate peaceful resolution. Our theory is based on the recognition that both voting and fighting are intrinsically correlated actions: individuals who undertake the individually irrational act of voting are unusually prone the individually irrational act of voluntary combat.

Suggested Citation

  • John Londregan & Andrea Vindigni, 2006. "Voting as a Credible Threat," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 18, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    • Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:18
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Matthew Ellman & Leonard Wantchekon, 2000. "Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(2), pages 499-531.
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    5. Yoram Barzel & Eugene Silberberg, 1973. "Is the act of voting rational?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 51-58, September.
    6. Howard Margolis, 1977. "Probability of a tie election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 135-138, September.
    7. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Reinstein, David & Hugh-Jones, David, 2010. "The Benefit of Anonymity in Public Goods Games," Economics Discussion Papers 2933, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    3. Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2014. "Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies," CEPR Discussion Papers 10178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    5. Anjali Thomas Bohlken, 2010. "Coups, Elections and the Predatory State," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(2), pages 169-215, April.
    6. Hugh-Jones, David & Reinstein, David, 2014. "Exclude the Bad Actors or Learn About The Group," Economics Discussion Papers 10010, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    7. Aditya Bhave & Christopher Kingston, 2010. "Military coups and the consequences of durable de facto power: the case of Pakistan," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 51-76, February.

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