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Voting as a Rational Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Aaron Edlin

    (Department of Economics and School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, USA, aedlin@econ.columbia.edu)

  • Andrew Gelman

    (Department of Statistics and Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, USA, gelman@stat.columbia.edu)

  • Noah Kaplan

    (Department of Political Science, University of Houston, Texas, USA, nkaplan@uh.edu)

Abstract

For voters with `social' preferences, the expected utility of voting is approximately independent of the size of the electorate, suggesting that rational voter turnouts can be substantial even in large elections. Less important elections are predicted to have lower turnout, but a feedback mechanism keeps turnout at a reasonable level under a wide range of conditions. The main contributions of this paper are: (1) to show how, for an individual with both selfish and social preferences, the social preferences will dominate and make it rational for a typical person to vote even in large elections; (2) to show that rational socially motivated voting has a feedback mechanism that stabilizes turnout at reasonable levels (e.g., 50% of the electorate); (3) to link the rational social-utility model of voter turnout with survey findings on socially motivated vote choice .

Suggested Citation

  • Aaron Edlin & Andrew Gelman & Noah Kaplan, 2007. "Voting as a Rational Choice," Rationality and Society, , vol. 19(3), pages 293-314, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:19:y:2007:i:3:p:293-314
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463107077384
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    References listed on IDEAS

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