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Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?

Author

Listed:
  • Serge Blondel

    (GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - AGROCAMPUS OUEST - Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage)

  • Louis Lévy-Garboua

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We exhibit two necessary conditions that a theory of rational decision must satisfy in order to solve the paradox. We then show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve it because each theory meets either one or the other necessary condition, but not both. However, the paradox of not voting is consistent with an amended version of third-generation prospect theory in which the reference is merely to vote or abstain. We are grateful to an anonymous referee and Ashley Piggins for the valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Citation: Serge Blondel and Louis Lévy-garboua, (2011) ''Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 31 No. 4 pp. 3158-3168. Contact: Serge Blondel-serge.blondel@univ-angers.fr, Louis Lévy-garboua-llg@univ-paris1.fr.

Suggested Citation

  • Serge Blondel & Louis Lévy-Garboua, 2011. "Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01476363, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01476363
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01476363v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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