IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v129y2006i1p159-167.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

All voting is strategic

Author

Listed:
  • James Buchanan

    ()

  • Yong Yoon

Abstract

All voting is strategic because the shared outcomes are note within the choice set of any voter, the elements of which can only be strategies. Voting behavior need not re- flect the individual's ordering of outcomes, and the conventional distinction between sincere and sophisticated voting is misguided. In voting choice, the ordinal ranking of outcomes must be supplemented by intrapersonal evaluation of utility differences among these outcomes and also by predictions concerning the behavior of other participants in the nexus of interdependence. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, B.V. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • James Buchanan & Yong Yoon, 2006. "All voting is strategic," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 159-167, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:129:y:2006:i:1:p:159-167 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9021-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-9021-4
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:01:p:102-114_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1997. "Social Choice Theory," Discussion Papers 1196, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. James M. Buchanan, 1954. "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 334-334.
    5. Sen, Amartya, 1995. "Rationality and Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 1-24, March.
    6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mohammad Mirhosseini, 2015. "Primaries with strategic voters: trading off electability and ideology," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 457-471, March.
    2. Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2007. "Strategic voting under proportional representation and coalition governments : a simulation and laboratory experiment," Papers 07-55, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    3. Trevon D. Logan, 2007. "Whoa, Nellie! Empirical Tests of College Football's Conventional Wisdom," NBER Working Papers 13596, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. J. Buchanan & Y. Yoon, 2012. "Choosing for others: A neglected element in the theory of collective action," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 9-16, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:129:y:2006:i:1:p:159-167. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.