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All voting is strategic

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  • James Buchanan
  • Yong Yoon

Abstract

All voting is strategic because the shared outcomes are note within the choice set of any voter, the elements of which can only be strategies. Voting behavior need not re- flect the individual's ordering of outcomes, and the conventional distinction between sincere and sophisticated voting is misguided. In voting choice, the ordinal ranking of outcomes must be supplemented by intrapersonal evaluation of utility differences among these outcomes and also by predictions concerning the behavior of other participants in the nexus of interdependence. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, B.V. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • James Buchanan & Yong Yoon, 2006. "All voting is strategic," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 159-167, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:129:y:2006:i:1:p:159-167
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9021-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B. & Weber, Robert J., 1993. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 102-114, March.
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    4. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    5. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1997. "Social Choice Theory," Discussion Papers 1196, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. James M. Buchanan, 1954. "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 334-334.
    7. Sen, Amartya, 1995. "Rationality and Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 1-24, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Trevon Logan, 2011. "Econometric tests of American college football's conventional wisdom," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(20), pages 2493-2518.
    2. Trevon D. Logan, 2007. "Whoa, Nellie! Empirical Tests of College Football's Conventional Wisdom," NBER Working Papers 13596, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. J. Buchanan & Y. Yoon, 2012. "Choosing for others: A neglected element in the theory of collective action," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 9-16, October.
    4. Mohammad Mirhosseini, 2015. "Primaries with strategic voters: trading off electability and ideology," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 457-471, March.
    5. Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2007. "Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation and Coalition Governments: A Simulation and Laboratory Experiment," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-55, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.

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