IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization

  • Arnaud Dellis
  • Mandar Oak

    ()

    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

We use the citizen-candidate model to study the differential incentives that different voting rules provide for candidate entry, and their effect on policy polarization. In particular, we show that allowing voters to cast multiple votes leads to equilibria which support multiple candidate clusters. These equilibria are more polarized than those obtained under the Plurality Rule. We also show that equilibria under the Alternative Vote Rule do not exhibit multiple candidate clusters and they are less polarizing than those under the Plurality Rule. These results differ from those obtained in the existing literature, where the set of candidates is exogenous. Thus, our paper contributes to the scholarly literature as well as public debate on the merits of using alternative voting rules by highlighting the importance of endogenous candidacy.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/doc/wp2013-02.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 2013-02.

as
in new window

Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2013-02
Contact details of provider: Postal: Adelaide SA 5005
Phone: (618) 8303 5540
Web page: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jean-François Laslier, 1996. "Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 75-93, January.
  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Discussion Papers 1214, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti & Roberto Perotti & Massimo Rostagno, 2002. "Electoral Systems And Public Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(2), pages 609-657, May.
  4. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
  5. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
  6. Laslier, J.F., 1996. "Aggregation of Preferences with a Variable set of Alternatives," Papers 9628, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  7. Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January.
  8. Myerson, Roger B., 1999. "Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 671-697, April.
  9. Arnaud Dellis, 2013. "The two-party system under alternative voting procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 263-284, January.
  10. Alessro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, . "The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives," Penn CARESS Working Papers b96440ba0bfa06ca550ac40aa, Penn Economics Department.
  11. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
  12. Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2011. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1464-1480, July.
  13. Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study," IDEI Working Papers 559, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  14. Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2001. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2682, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Sandro Brusco & Jaideep Roy, 2008. "Aggregate Uncertainty in the Citizen-Candidate Model Yields Extremist Parties," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 08-11, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
  16. Yasutora Watanabe & Kei Kawai, 2009. "Inferring Strategic Voting," 2009 Meeting Papers 803, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  17. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  18. DUTTA, Bhaskar & JACKSON, Matthew O. & LE BRETON, Michel, 1999. "Strategic candidacy and voting procedures," CORE Discussion Papers 1999011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  19. Roger B. Myerson, 2006. "Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 727-742, December.
  20. Dellis, Arnaud, 2009. "Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 772-801, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2013-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dmitriy Kvasov)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.