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Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization

  • Arnaud Dellis
  • Mandar Oak

    ()

    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

We use the citizen-candidate model to study the differential incentives that different voting rules provide for candidate entry, and their effect on policy polarization. In particular, we show that allowing voters to cast multiple votes leads to equilibria which support multiple candidate clusters. These equilibria are more polarized than those obtained under the Plurality Rule. We also show that equilibria under the Alternative Vote Rule do not exhibit multiple candidate clusters and they are less polarizing than those under the Plurality Rule. These results differ from those obtained in the existing literature, where the set of candidates is exogenous. Thus, our paper contributes to the scholarly literature as well as public debate on the merits of using alternative voting rules by highlighting the importance of endogenous candidacy.

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File URL: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/doc/wp2013-02.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 2013-02.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2013-02
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