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Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-FranÚois Laslier

    (THEMA, CNRS, UniversitÊ de Cergy-Pontoise, 33, boulevard du Port, F-95011, Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France)

Abstract

A social choice correspondence called the Essential set is studied with the help of an axiom called Cloning Consistency. Cloning consistency is the requirement that the formal choice rule be insensitive to the replication of alternatives. The Essential set is the support of the optimal mixed strategies in a symmetric two-party electoral competition game.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-FranÚois Laslier, 2000. "Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(2), pages 269-282.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:2:p:269-282
    Note: Received: 24 March 1998/Accepted: 3 March 1999
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Felix Brandt, 2015. "Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 793-804, December.
    2. Z. Emel Öztürk, 2020. "Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 801-831, September.
    3. Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March.
    4. Hiroki Saitoh, 2022. "Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 139-173, July.
    5. Chevaleyre, Yann & Lang, Jérôme & Maudet, Nicolas & Monnot, Jérôme & Xia, Lirong, 2012. "New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 74-88.
    6. LASLIER, Jean-François & PICARD, Nathalie, 2000. "Distributive politics: does electoral competition promote inequality ?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Florian Brandl & Felix Brandt & Christian Stricker, 2022. "An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(1), pages 5-38, January.
    8. Florian Brandl & Felix Brandt, 2021. "A Natural Adaptive Process for Collective Decision-Making," Papers 2103.14351, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    9. Brandt, Felix & Saile, Christian & Stricker, Christian, 2022. "Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    10. Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix & Brill, Markus, 2018. "On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 1-18.
    11. Florian Brandl & Felix Brandt, 2020. "Arrovian Aggregation of Convex Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 799-844, March.
    12. Brandt, Felix & Harrenstein, Paul, 2011. "Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1721-1731, July.
    13. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    14. Lê Nguyên Hoang, 2017. "Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 679-701, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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